

the review of
metaphysics

a philosophical quarterly

Review

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Source: *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Dec., 2009), pp. 489-491

Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387717>

Accessed: 13-05-2015 16:53 UTC

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intermediate powers within the state. “Abolish in a monarchy,” he wrote, “the prerogatives of the lords, the clergy, the nobility and the towns (as Parliament did in England) and you will soon have a popular state—or, indeed, a state despotic.” A populist government, particularly if it falls into the hands of the lower orders is likely to be more tyrannical than any monarchy. Absent virtue in the people, such a government will make the public treasury their “object” and distribute the public money to themselves.

Rahe is sparing in explicitly relating his text to the present, although he intends his reader to do so. As one reads *Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty* the implied lessons are many. It is easy to find in the political and financial sectors of the present a parallel to Montesquieu’s account of aristocratic corruption. “When the ruling families no longer observe the laws, the republic may continue to exist with regard to and among the nobles, but it will be despotic with regard to the governed.”

This volume is not Rahe’s first excursion into the past to understand the present. It follows upon his *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution* (1992) and his *Against Throne and Altar: Machiavelli and Political Theory under the English Republic* (2008). With this and its companion volume, *Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift*, also published this year by Yale University Press, Rahe has endeavored, in his words, “to flesh out in the light of the ruminations of Montesquieu and his most important heirs, a political science and an account of the political psychology of liberal democratic man sufficient to enable us to recognize the plight that we are now in so that we can come to grips with the peculiar maladies that give rise to the present discontent.” No one who reads this and his companion volume can deny that he has done so.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

QUINE, W. V. *Quine in Dialogue*. Edited by Dagfinn Føllesdal and Douglas B. Quine. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008. 378 pp. Cloth, \$39.95—This wonderful volume is the companion to *Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays*, also edited by Føllesdal and Douglas Quine and published by HUP in 2008, the centenary of Quine’s birth. *Confessions* collects an array of Quine’s published and previously unpublished scholarly articles from 1939 to 2001. *Quine in Dialogue* collects works ranging from 1935 to 1999, dividing them into three parts: “Interviews,” “Quine on Other Philosophers,” and “Popular Pieces.” All but 13 of the 63 pieces have been published previously, though so far and wide that having them in one collection is a boon. Of the 13, one is a previously unpublished interview, while the others are transcriptions of note cards (in one case an envelope) in which Quine is introducing, thanking, or saying farewell to colleagues.

All the usual suspects are present in this volume: analyticity, indeterminacy of translation and reference, philosophy of logic, empiricism, behaviorism, naturalism. There are discussions of (and in some cases with) Peirce, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Goodman, Dreben, Gibson, and many others. Ever present, even in transcribed interviews, is Quine's elegant and sometimes too-terse prose. And, while this volume would not be the best of places to start reading Quine, it has a great deal to offer those familiar with or even steeped in Quine. No great philosophical surprises are to be had. Familiar, even repetitious, chords are struck throughout. However, the editors have succeeded in selecting pieces that bring new emphasis and greater detail to certain aspects of Quine's views—how he sees himself differing from Davidson, how he feels Rorty has misread him, the evolution of the notions of observation sentence, stimulus meaning, and analyticity.

What is especially enjoyable about this volume, though, are the glints and glimmers of personality which shine through. For those who were disappointed by that travelogue-cum-autobiography, *Time of My Life*, there is a bit more to be had here. Many of the selections show a deal more of the man himself than we are accustomed to seeing in his logic and philosophy.

Known for his verbal efficiency, sometimes what Quine leaves unsaid is more revealing than that said. Edo Pivcevic, in a 1988 interview which has some interesting details about Quine's early career, asks about the rise of Nazism as Quine experienced it during his fellowship year in Europe. Quine soberly and succinctly relates the outrage and alarm he shared with his colleagues, "with two rather vacillating exceptions." When Pivcevic asks who, Quine respectfully declines: "*De mortuis nihil nisi bonum.*" In a 1993 interview with Veery, we see Quine's patient silence allow the interviewer to clarify poorly asked questions. Also on display is his ability to answer as much by concision as by content—and this to a question certain philosophers would take as license to bloviate: "Veery: What can a philosopher learn from an artist? Quine: Selectiveness certainly."

The middle part, "Quine on Other Philosophers" (in addition to being philosophically illuminating, of course), is warmed by Quine's cultured affection for fellow inquirers. He takes great ("immodest" he quips) pride in the admiration and respect shown him by Russell in the logical correspondences. It is a delight to see the masters of the first and second half of the twentieth century in mutual approbation. A 1987 piece written for the Yale Review enriches our understanding of his love for Carnap. This four-pager paints a personal portrait of Carnap the man and friend, including a passage on Ina Carnap, Eva Hempel, and the good times and "high spirits" had by the couples.

The "Popular Pieces" of the third part further show the congruence of Quine's scholarly respect for inquiry, precision, and hard work and his warm respect for friends and inquirers of like mind. "What I Believe" from 1984 opens in Democritean voice: "The world is a multitude of

minute twitches in the void,” and closes with Quine’s thoughts on morals and “the future of man,” including an environmentalist warning, and the hopeful promise of endless inquiry for “young people athirst for knowledge.” “To a Graduate Student in Philosophy” and “Advice to the Next Generation,” stress that deep and genuine inquiry, having work one loves while being willing to do the necessary drudgery—these things are the keys to a happy life, but no more so than the company of good friends.

These are just a few of the highlights of this collection, focused mostly on what is revealed about the man, W. V. Quine. There is plenty of useful philosophical material to be had as well. Every respectable library should have this volume on its shelves, and any scholar or graduate student who fancies herself well-versed in Quine will want to own it and read it.—Paul Gregory, *Washington and Lee University*.

ROGERSON, Kenneth F. *The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant’s Aesthetics*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2008. ix + 134 pp. Cloth \$45.00; paper, \$19.95—Rogerson addresses two issues that arise from the key claim of Kant’s plan in “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” the first half of the *Critique of Judgment*. Though Kant scholars agree on the plan in the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” they disagree on the central claim of that plan. The plan is straightforward. An object is beautiful if and only if “it gives us pleasure the source of which is a mental state similar to cognition entitled ‘the free harmony of the imagination and the understanding.’” Based on that mental state, judgments of taste rise above subjectivity and holds for all who appreciate in a proper manner objects of beauty. Such judgments possess a kind of objectivity. Occupying a position between subjectivity and objectivity, aesthetic judgments are “subjectively universal.” The claim is this, “Kant’s position rests on the claim that aesthetic judgments are universally ‘valid’ since they are based on the universal pleasurable of the free harmony of the imagination and understanding.” Two issues arise: the meaning of the claim within Kantian philosophy and why Kant believes that “such a mental state is universally pleasing.”

Both issues become pressing once they are placed within Kant’s epistemology. Cognition refers to “applying concepts to a manifold of sense data.” Judging brings sense data under concepts by following a rule. This is harmonizing the faculty of understanding with the faculty of imagination (the faculty of receiving data). However, in aesthetic judgments the harmonizing occurs without being governed by rules. The difficulty is “what sense there is in claiming that aesthetic contemplation is a kind of ‘judging’ without rules when the very definition of judging in the Kant lexicon is that of a rule-governed activity.” After examining